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A few months ago, I wrote a piece on this blog entitled ‘ The Pechstein case: Transnational constitutionalism in
action at the Bundesgerichtshof’, in which I argued that the Pechstein case, then pending in front of the BGH,
should be understood as a transnational constitutional matter. Johanna Croon-Gestefeld already picked up on
my blog, to argue that Tuesday’s decision of the BGH in the Pechstein case can hardly be understood as
exercising a constitutional control on the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). I entirely share her view that this
judgment is a missed opportunity and that transnational constitutionalism should look differently. In this blog, I
would like to go a bit further and try to explain why the BGH failed to understand the constitutional dimension of
this case and especially to properly assess the independence of the CAS.
The first striking element of the press release of the BGH is its difficulty to acknowledge the forced nature of CAS
arbitration. In its last paragraph, it starts by stating that “Die Klägerin hat die Schiedsvereinbarung freiwillig
unterzeichnet.” This is surely true if you mean that she freely decided to become a professional speed-skater
and participate in high-level competitions. Yet, as pointed out by the BGH itself in the following sentence, this
‘consent’ is very much “fremdbestimmt” (decided by a third-party). Can individual consent be deemed free when
it is forced by a third-party? The paradoxical reasoning of the BGH betrays its unease with the necessity to
acknowledge that CAS arbitration is post-consensual in nature (an unease shared by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
(SFT) in its Cañas case). Indeed, arbitration is traditionally legitimated by the free consent of the parties.
But in certain domains, investment arbitration and sports arbitration for example, international arbitration has
turned post-consensual. What does it imply for international arbitration in these fields? First of all, that one needs
a new legitimation to justify the forced jurisdiction of the CAS. This might be constituted, for example, by the
necessity to safeguard the equality in front of the rules of the athletes engaged in international competitions.
Second, one needs to reconceptualise the function of the CAS and acknowledge that it is very much in the
business of exercising international public authority as defined by Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke in their
recent book on the legitimacy of international courts. In turn, this must mean that the arbitral process and the
structure of the CAS should aim at what von Bogdandy and Venzke have called a democratic legitimacy. One of
the key elements of such a democratic legitimacy is that courts must be independent from the parties involved in
the dispute and even more so from the transnational authorities they are supposed to check.
The question of the independence of the CAS from the International Skating Union, and more broadly of the
Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs), was at the heart of the Pechstein case. In its press release, the BGH
considers that the CAS is a true arbitral tribunal in the sense of German civil procedural law and that it is not
structurally imbalanced in favour of the SGBs.[1] The BGH’s assessment relies on four main arguments:
1. SGBs and athletes share the same interest in the fight against doping
2. SGBs and athletes share the same interest in having a uniform and swift sporting justice
3. The CAS Code allows for sufficient safeguards in case an arbitrator is not sufficient independent/impartial
4. The athlete can appeal to the SFT to challenge the lack of independence of an arbitrator
In the following sections of this blog, I will aim at critically unpacking and deconstructing these four arguments
one by one.
A. The shared interest of athletes and SGBs in the fight against doping
In a first paragraph, the BGH sets out to rebut the OLG’s argument that the CAS is structurally imbalanced in
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favour of the SGBs, i.e. due to the selection process of the CAS arbitrators included in the CAS list. In the past,
and still nowadays, it is the ICAS, a body constituted of 20 members nominated overwhelmingly by the SGBs,
which decides who gets to be on the CAS list. Currently, based on their official CVs available on the CAS’
website, 13 out of 20 ICAS members have or had executive positions within SGBs. Hence, the OLG’s reasonable
assumption that the selection process of arbitrators could lead to the perception that the CAS was in a way
captured by the SGBs and prone to favour their interests and to not fully check their exercise of public authority.
The BGH’s trick to rebut this finding of the OLG is to consider that the interests of the athletes and of the SGBs
overlap in the fight against doping. Thus, meaning implicitly that it would not be a problem that the SGBs have a
disproportionate influence in the drafting of the CAS list. This is a surprising argumentation to say the least. It is a
like claiming that the independence of the criminal justice is superfluous, because both the State and the
accused citizen share an interest in public safety and security. To the contrary, it is easy to discern that beyond
an undoubtedly shared concern for the fight against doping, the athlete and the SGB involved in a particular
dispute over a failed anti-doping test have radically opposite interests. The SGB aims at banning the athlete from
competing, while the athlete is defending its right to participate in a competition and to exercise her profession.
Consequently, the independence of the CAS is a crucial institutional feature to ensure that the SGBs do not
abuse their legitimate regulatory and executive powers in an anti-doping dispute.
B. The shared interest in a uniform and swift sporting justice
The BGH, thereafter, argues that the CAS would be necessary to ensure the uniformity and swiftness of sporting
justice and that this would be also in the interest of the athletes. I actually share the view of the BGH on this need
for a uniform sporting justice embodied by the CAS. I even believe that in certain types of disputes its jurisdiction
could be widened. Still, the judges failed to comprehend that this argument can be used only as a justification for
the post-consensual nature of CAS arbitration. The need for uniformity and swiftness might indeed call for a
single institution having mandatory jurisdiction over sporting disputes, but not for this same institution to be
captured by the SGBs or to fail to ensure due process guarantees. Here, ironically, the BGH is laying the ground
for a stricter constitutional review. It is the acknowledged necessity of forced arbitration that calls for an
impeccable CAS on the due process side.
C. The CAS Code safeguards the independence/impartiality of CAS arbitrators
In the following sections of its reasoning, the BGH argues that any remaining imbalance of the CAS in favour of
the SGBs could be remedied via the procedural safety mechanisms included in the CAS code. In the full
judgment it probably refers to article S.18 CAS Code providing that arbitrators have to sign “an official declaration
undertaking to exercise their functions personally with total objectivity, independence and impartiality, and in
conformity with the provisions of this Code” and to article R.33 CAS Code stating that “[e]very arbitrator shall be
and remain impartial and independent of the parties and shall immediately disclose any circumstances which
may affect her/his independence with respect to any of the parties.” Based on article R.34 CAS Code, any
challenge of an arbitrator on the basis of the latter provision must be submitted to the ICAS Board composed of
six members, five of which are or have been in the past involved in executive positions at SGBs. In these
conditions, it should be obvious that challenging the independence of an arbitrator vis-à-vis the SGBs is
extremely unattractive for an athlete, even more so when considering that in case of failure there is a risk of
alienating the arbitrator in question. This is why the CAS’s independence issue is systemic and cannot be solved
without re-designing the selection process and composition of the ICAS.
Furthermore, the BGH also argues that both parties can chose an arbitrator on the list and that both arbitrators
will then designate the President of the panel. This is plainly wrong. In appeal cases, concerning almost all the
anti-doping cases and which was the procedure followed in the Pechstein case, it is the President of the appeal
division that designates the President of the panel.[2] This person is directly nominated by ICAS and it suffices to
remind that the previous holder of this position was (until 2013) Thomas Bach (now IOC President, then IOC
Executive Board member), to demonstrate how doubtful his or her independence from the SGBs was and still is.
It is difficult to understand how such a basic mistake has found its way into a BGH press release. Even the
official CAS Code Commentary by the CAS Secretary General openly justifies this exclusive prerogative of the
2/3
President of the appeal division by stating that she “can better evaluate if it is preferable to appoint an
experienced arbitrator in order to act as chairman of the Panel or a less experienced CAS arbitrator, who is not
widely known to the parties but who would have the necessary background to rule on a particular case”.[3] The
dilettante manner in which the BGH has conducted its assessment of the CAS’ independence strongly contrasts
with the OLG’s thorough discussion of the problematic role of the ICAS and of the president of the appeal
division.
C. The SFT’s control of the independence/impartiality of CAS arbitrators
Finally, the BGH insists that the losing party has the possibility to appeal to the SFT, which can annul the award.
The problem is that the SFT has chose to be a mere paper tiger. Yes, it intervened (mildly) in the famous Gundel
case in 1993, because back then the IOC was directly and openly controlling the CAS, but since then it has
adopted a very narrow interpretation of the scope for challenges of the independence of CAS arbitrators .
Generally, the SFT (to its credit openly) considers the CAS as a necessary evil that should be (very)
benevolently checked. This is hardly a credible avenue to ensure that the CAS abides by the democratic
standards called for on the basis of its mandatory global jurisdictions.
On another blog, I called this decision surrealist, because it openly disregards some relatively uncontroversial
facts and comes close to the famous Magritte painting ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’  by denying the obvious: that
CAS arbitration is forced arbitration. I believe it fails to do so because it is not ready to acknowledge the post-
consensual legitimacy of CAS arbitration. Yet, this recognition will come one day or another, and with it should
not come the demise of the CAS, but its much-needed democratization. The BGH’s failure to put on a
constitutional lens in this transnational legal context might be remedied by the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s
readiness to do so, if Claudia Pechstein finds the will and resources (she is facing a legal bill of 300 000 euros) to
attack a judgment once again. One can only hope that the Bundesverfassungsgericht would transpose its
famous Solange approach to the CAS. Indeed, it should be allowed to operate only as long as it guarantees to
the affected parties a (currently lacking) fair and independent judicial process.
[1] “Der CAS ist ein „echtes“ Schiedsgericht im Sinne der §§ 1025 ff. ZPO.”
[2] Article R54 CAS Code: “If three arbitrators are to be appointed, the President of the Division shall appoint the
President of the Panel following nomination of the arbitrator by the Respondent and after having consulted the
arbitrators.”
[3] See footnote 2 in M. Reeb & D. Mavromati, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Commentary, cases
and materials. Kluwer, 2015, p.479.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  Duval, Antoine: The Pechstein case: Transnational constitutionalism in inaction at the
Bundesgerichtshof, VerfBlog, 2016/6/10, http://verfassungsblog.de/the-pechstein-case-transnational-
constitutionalism-in-inaction-at-the-bundesgerichtshof/.
3/3
